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  Almost 90 years ago Viner (1923) identified dumping as a “problem” in international trade; more 
recently Prusa (2005) and Zanardi (2006) have found the overuse of antidumping to be the “problem” in 
international trade.
1  Others have observed the pervasive use of antidumping since the end of the Uruguay 
Round and the resulting framework of trade liberalization, as well as the trend of increasing cases filed by 
and against developing countries.  What has not been well documented is how dramatically the patterns 
of antidumping usage have changed, to the point that while obviously impacting trade flows, the impact is 
now of most concern to the developing world.   
 
  This paper attempts to stimulate discussion about antidumping policy among development 
economists, who have largely ignored the topic; evaluating trade policy by developing economies without 
considering antidumping is incomplete and ignores the extent to which it may be substitutable for other 
methods of trade protection.  Antidumping has become truly a “problem” of development.  Despite some 
debate on the role of international openness in determining economic performance, there is little research 
on how the use of particular trade policy mechanisms affects either trade openness or economic 
performance.  In what follows we examine the role of developing countries in antidumping, with 
                                                            
1 Dumping is essentially the sale of foreign goods in the domestic market at prices below “fair value” – this is generally the price 
(after making appropriate adjustments) of the same goods in the exporter’s home market, but can also involve comparisons to 
cost.  Antidumping laws allow domestic firms to seek duties to offset dumping when it is shown to cause them “material injury.” 
Studies have pointed to welfare losses due to antidumping usage (Gallaway et al. (1999), Prusa (2001)).  In addition, 
determinants of antidumping usage related to political and macroeconomic factors –- rather than case-specific details -- suggest 
viewing antidumping as simply another protectionist device (Feinberg and Hirsch (1989), Knetter and Prusa (2003).  On the other 
hand, there is some support for antidumping to be seen as an insurance-type mechanism, allowing for greater trade policy 
liberalization – especially by developing economies (Finger and Nogues (2006), Feinberg and Reynolds (2007)).  
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particular focus on which countries employ this instrument of protection, and which countries are heavily 
targeted; we also note those countries which are targeted but do not respond in kind. 
 
II. Literature Review 
  Zanardi (2006) documents the increasing number of new users of antidumping, mostly developing 
countries,
2 starting in the late 1980s but accelerating with the formation of the WTO in the mid-1990s.  
His data, however, end in 2001, at which point roughly equal shares of case initiations were produced by 
“traditional” and new users.
3  From those data, we see that – in terms of the intensity of antidumping 
filings (relative to value of imports) – the only “traditional” developed country antidumping users among 
the ten most active countries since 1988 are Australia and New Zealand.   Bown (2008), updating these 
figures through 2004, finds that the historical “big 4” developed country users of antidumping – U.S., EU, 
Australia and Canada – filed just 33% of such cases during 1995-2004, compared to 73% in the 1985-94 
period.  Explaining the industry-specific determinants of antidumping filings by nine major developing 
countries over the 1995-2002 period,
4 Bown finds that – in addition to a general trend of greater use – 
steel and chemicals industries, and larger industries facing increased import competition and adverse 
macroeconomic shocks, have been the primary users of this policy instrument (as has also been found for 
the “traditional” users). 
  Zanardi (2006) also examines, through 2001, trends in target countries of antidumping cases, 
finding that developing economies’ share as targets of such cases rose from 46% in the 1981-87 period to 
68% in the 1995-2001 period.  A similar analysis of the number of cases targeting a country relative to its 
exports finds that measure has been uniformly high for developing and transition economies at least since 
1981.    
                                                            
2 In what follows I will define “developing countries” by World Bank standards of low-income and low-middle-income 
countries, “middle-income countries” as those categorized as high-middle-income, and “high-income countries” as OECD and 
non-OECD high-income countries (the World Bank classifies all OECD countries as high income). 
3 Prusa (2001) had noted the beginnings of this trend, looking at data through 1997. 
4 Data required for his econometric estimation precluded using the full data through 2004.  
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  Much research has tried to explain motivations for antidumping law use by both developed and 
developing economies, with some evidence of macroeconomic determinants (Knetter and Prusa (2003), 
retaliation for previous antidumping filings (Blonigen and Bown (2003), and Feinberg and Reynolds 
(2006)), and as a quid pro quo or “escape valve” allowing for general tariff and other trade concessions –
especially for developing economies (Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) and Finger and Nogues (2006)).
5  
Focusing on India, Bown and Tovar (forthcoming) find evidence of both escape valve and retaliation 
motivations.   
  As for the effects of this increased antidumping usage by developing economies, there has been 
relatively little research.
6  Bown and Tovar (forthcoming) find that up to 13% of Indian manufacturing 
imports were in 6-digit HS categories involved in antidumping (or safeguard) cases, while Ganguli (2008) 
estimates a roughly 50% reduction in imports of affected 6-digit HS categories through three years after 
initiation in India.
7  Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) provide evidence that active “new users” of 
antidumping measures–most of which are developing countries--experience significant reductions in 
import volumes beyond the specific narrow sectors targeted (a “chilling” or “spillover” effect on trade 
more generally), largely offsetting the trade-increasing effects of Uruguay Round liberalization. 
  As to the question of why developing countries have been the dominant force in recent 
antidumping usage, one might expect to see work on this topic in the development literature.  However, 
the closest research involves the debate over the relationship between trade liberalization and growth.  
These studies have provided mixed results at best.  Winters et al. (2004) discuss this literature noting that 
the bulk of evidence is weakly supportive of a positive effect (while acknowledging critical views such as 
those of Rodrik (2001)).  But they note the difficulty both in measuring “openness” and in establishing 
                                                            
5 Moore and Zanardi (2009) and Prusa and Li (2009) question this finding. 
6 There has been considerable research, however, for developed countries, finding both significant welfare losses and reductions 
in import flows from antidumping usage.  See, for example, Galloway et al. (1999) and Prusa (2001) for the U.S., Vandenbussche 
and Zanardi (2006) for global antidumping usage.   Somewhat more mixed is the finding of Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) 
for the EU, showing that antidumping can promote technological gains for less-efficient firms but lowers productivity growth for 
firms on the efficiency frontier.  
7 He reports that over 96% of filed cases for which data were available led to dumping duties imposed.  
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causation, along with dealing with other appropriate policies that are generally viewed as necessary to 
accompany a liberal trade regime (e.g., investment policies, reducing corruption).  They especially note 
the need in econometric studies to aggregate the various dimensions of trade restriction to a single index. 
More recently, Kneller et al. (2008) make similar arguments.  No mention is made of antidumping policy, 
as this is clearly far too disaggregate an instrument of trade policy for these studies to consider.   
  Bown (2010) provides updated views of trends in both usage and targeting of antidumping (along 
with other forms of “temporary trade barriers”). Limiting his analysis to the G20 countries, he provides 
estimates of both stocks and flows of antidumping and other protection.
8  Comparing 2009 to 1997 (two 
years with comparable “stocks” of developed country antidumping protection (orders in place), both well 
below peak levels of such protection which occurred in 2002), he finds that the share of the developed 
economy stock of antidumping protection imposed against other developed economies fell from 50% to 
33% -- the flow of developed-developed antidumping cases has fallen more dramatically. He finds more 
dramatic changes in patterns for the stock of G20 developing country antidumping protection, which has 
grown five-fold from 1997 to 2009, with more than two-thirds of the 2009 stock of such activity targeting 




Despite much concern expressed in the recent major global recession that overall antidumping 
usage would spiral out of control, this seems not to have occurred.
10  While different methods of counting 
cases produce somewhat different patterns, the general themes remain (with relatively small increases in 
recent years despite the severity of the recession).  The method employed here of counting separately 
                                                            
8 These are both defined in terms of numbers of HS-6 categories affected. 
9 While countervailing duty (CVD) cases are sometimes filed jointly with antidumping petitions, the focus of this paper, and all 
numbers presented, involve antidumping alone. 




multiple country targets by the same country for the same product seems a reasonable proxy for capturing 
both depth and breadth of administered protection sought.
11  
Figure 1 illustrates that while global antidumping usage increased in 2008, it fell a bit in 2009, 
remaining near historical lows, far below the peak levels of the early 2000s (usage fell still more in 2010). 
At the same time global trade (in nominal dollar terms) has more than doubled since 1995, even after the 
recent recession-induced decline.  However the share of these cases filed by developing countries has 
increased dramatically as has the share of cases targeting developing world exporters.  Consequently, the 
intersection – cases involving a protectionist battle between two developing countries – has also grown. 
Now consider further the developing country (as noted earlier, this includes low-income and 
lower-middle-income countries) petitioners and the targets of antidumping filings.  From 1995 to 2009, 
firms in developing countries filed 1,542 antidumping petitions, and were the target of 1,724 such 
petitions.
12  Figures 2 and 3 describe trends in these filings over the period, with dramatic declines in 
high-income-country petitions and increases in the share of petitions from developing countries; since 
2002 over 50% of antidumping petitions have been filed by developing countries, while there has been a 
steady decline (to about 25% in 2008-09) in the share filed by high-income country petitioners.   
Figure 4 combines information on sources and targets of new antidumping petitions.
13  Roughly 
95% of all antidumping cases in 2008-09 involved developing and upper-middle-income countries as 
either petitioning or target countries (so only 5% involve only high-income countries). In contrast only 
75% of cases involved these countries in the 1995-1998 period.  More than 50% of cases in 2008-09 have 
no high-income-country involvement on either side of the case.  Since 2005 almost 30% of all cases filed 
have involved only developing countries (on both sides of a case).  Although many of these involve 
                                                            
11 An alternative (adopted in some of Bown’s work) is to lump together (as a single “case”) all cases initiated by the same 
industry at the same time, regardless of how many countries are targeted. 
12 As noted earlier, the focus of this paper is antidumping and excludes CVD cases, which have rarely been used by developing 
countries.  Over the entire 15 year period examined here, only 54 CVD petitions were filed by countries other than the U.S., 
European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada.  There may be a trend in recent years toward relatively more CVD 
usage by developed economies, but these are still small in numbers relative to AD filings. 




Chinese exporters/producers on the receiving end and India on the petitioning side, the fact still remains 
that antidumping is now most prevalent in developing countries.   Even if we exclude cases involving 
China or India (on either side of a proceeding) (see Fig. 1a) -- leaving about 100 cases per year over the 
past decade -- a non-trivial share, up to 20 percent some years (averaging about 15%), are exclusively 
developing country matters. 
 
IV. Some evidence  
Can we say anything about antidumping’s impact
14 on the heavy users and heavily targeted 
economies in the developing world?  It is interesting to note that the leading developing country users of 
antidumping protection are quite different from the leading developing country targets of antidumping 
cases, raising some doubts to the view of that antidumping activity is often used in retaliation.  As seen in 
Figure 5, the leading developing country users have been India, China, South Africa, and Turkey.  Of 
these, only China and India have been significant targets of antidumping filings.  Figure 6 shows how the 
nine WTO-member developing countries which have been most active either as targets or sources of 
petitions (at least 50 cases filed by or against) have fared in the antidumping arena. China, Indonesia, and 
Thailand have been targets of antidumping activity with relatively little response; in contrast, firms in 
Egypt, India, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, and Turkey have filed antidumping cases disproportionate to 
the extent to which their exporters have been targeted. 
Though China has filed significantly more cases than either Indonesia or Thailand, its filings are 
still not proportionate to its instances of targeting (to some extent, this reflects China’s lack of filings in 
the early sample period since it did not join WTO until the end of 2001).  All three countries have filed 
                                                            
14 Of course, filing an antidumping petition does not guarantee an affirmative outcome and duties imposed. Countries differ in the 
rate at which petitioners succeed in gaining protection, however Prusa (2001), Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010), and others 




antidumping cases only half or less frequently than they have been filed against.  Why?  Are they 
embracing free trade?  Or are they protecting their industries in other ways?   
For China, state trading and alleged currency manipulation have been argued to be a form of 
protection which may have lessened the perceived need for antidumping protection.  If we normalize 
antidumping filings by imports over the 1995-2009 period (Figure 7), China and Thailand are comparable 
to the U.S. in their frequency of case filing, while Indonesia is about three times as aggressive as the U.S. 
is in antidumping actions (but still relatively passive compared to its role as an antidumping target, as 
seen in Figure 6).  Both Indonesia and Thailand made significant tariff concessions (double-digit 
percentage point reductions on average for industrial goods) in the Uruguay Round; and based on the 
most recent World Bank “Trade Brief” discussions, neither country has a particularly high Tariff Trade 
Restrictiveness Index.   
In contrast Egypt, India, Peru, and South Africa have all filed antidumping petitions more than 
three times as often as they have been filed against, and at rates –adjusting for their imports – at least 10 
times the rate of the U.S. (see Figure 7).
15  All four countries have generally reduced their antidumping 
activity in the past few years, however.  With the exception of South Africa, the World Bank reports, in 
their “Trade Briefs,” somewhat more restrictive trade policies for this group of countries than for the 
relatively light users discussed above.  One observation of some interest is that – except for India -- the 
relatively heavy users (Egypt, Peru, and South Africa) have protected industries across the board (with no 
one broad HS sector involved in more than 25% of filings since 1995), while the relatively light users 
(China, Indonesia, and Thailand) have taken a narrow focus – China protecting section VI (food, 
beverages, tobacco) with 61% of its filings, Thailand protecting section XV (metals and metal products) 
with 72% of its, and Indonesia protecting those two sectors with 56% of its petitions. 
                                                            
15 Turkey’s filing intensity is only about five times that of the U.S.; Pakistan’s is just slightly below the threshold of ten times the 
U.S. rate, but in addition their total antidumping involvement (on either side of a case) is quite small, just 64 cases total over the 
1995-2009 period. Egypt and Peru have been particularly focused in their cases on other developing countries, each filing more 
than 60% of their cases against developing countries (though Peru’s focus has been much more narrowly focused on China, with 
46% of their cases against China).  
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Is there a relationship between antidumping filings and typical development challenges – e.g., 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, income inequality?  As noted above little work has been done on these 
topics specific to the developing world, but for the U.S. and Europe welfare losses to petitioner countries 
from antidumping activity have been estimated.  As for income inequality, Brambilla et al. (2010) 
illustrate that a targeted developing country (Vietnam) experienced a negative shock to household income 
growth due to U.S. antidumping duties on catfish.  Whether developing-country antidumping petitioners 
experience adverse impacts has not been well-documented (though consumers most likely face higher 
prices).   
Consider some descriptive patterns of economic growth for five of the countries mentioned 
above:  Egypt, Indonesia, Peru, South Africa, and Thailand.
16  Can we detect any differences in these 
trends between the countries with particularly heavy and particularly light usage of antidumping remedies 
(both relative to their import value and relative to the targeting of their exports by antidumping cases filed 
by others)? 
Looking at the heavy antidumping users in the group of developing countries mentioned above 
(Egypt, Peru, South Africa) and the relatively light users (Indonesia, Thailand) do we see consistent 
patterns?  Average GDP growth (over the 1994-2008 period) averaged 4.6% for the former three 
countries, 4.1% for the latter two countries; GDP growth per capita averaged 2.9% for both groups.  As 
for import growth, the heavy user countries experienced the more rapid import volume growth, averaging 
a total increase of 196% over this 15 year period compared to a 101% increase for the relatively restrained 
users of antidumping.  It should certainly not be argued that heavy usage of antidumping remedies caused 
more imports; rather, this does recall the work of Finger and Nogues (2006) in pointing out that – in Latin 
America at least – antidumping statute use seemed to be in the context of a targeted development and 
                                                            
16 We exclude China and India in the following discussion.  For various reasons they seem like special cases; it is unlikely that 
their antidumping initiation activity has played a major role in their strong economic development over the past decade.  For a 
discussion of recent trends in India’s antidumping usage, see Feinberg (2010).  
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trade policy strategy that was on the whole promoting liberalization and openness.  It may be that 
countries with strong import growth are those in greatest need of an escape valve for selected industries. 
Table 1 reports the correlations between new antidumping filings per dollar of imports and GDP 
per capita, both across 31 countries (separately for each year from 2000 to 2008) and within each country 
(over the 1995-2008 period).  In virtually all cases the correlation coefficient is negative, ranging from -
0.12 to -0.30 by year across all countries, and negative for 28 of the 31 countries across years, generally 
in the -0.3 to -0.6 range.  While no claims of causation can be drawn from these results they are consistent 
with a pattern of richer countries filing relatively fewer cases than poorer ones, and of all countries filing 
fewer cases as they become richer.  The finding is suggestive of the weaknesses of the usage of 
antidumping law as a development strategy; however, a much more careful analysis would be required to 
sort out competing hypotheses. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  This paper has attempted to provoke development (and perhaps trade) economists to take a more 
careful look at antidumping filings and the extent to which developing countries have been increasingly 
involved in this activity.  Despite the title of this paper, antidumping of course remains a concern for trade 
flows, but is clearly now of greatest importance to the developing world.  Examining the causes and 
effects of the trends in its use, and perhaps suggesting welfare-enhancing alternatives would be a useful 
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    Table 1.  Correlations between Antidumping Cases per $US of imports and real GDP per capita (in $US) 
             
    Within countries, 1995-2008      Across country correlations (by year) 
         2000   -0.11908  
Argentina    -0.56     2001   -0.19017  
Australia    -0.59     2002   -0.22412  
Brazil    -0.52     2003   -0.25926  
Canada    -0.48     2004   -0.22489  
Chile    -0.52     2005   -0.30654  
China    -0.42     2006   -0.2939  
Colombia    -0.18     2007   -0.15495  
Costa  Rica    -0.42     2008   -0.19393  
E g y p t     - 0 . 1 9           
European  Union    -0.64          
India    -0.40          
Indonesia    -0.48          
Israel    -0.57          
Jamaica    -0.45          
Japan    0.31          
South  Korea    -0.35          
Malaysia    -0.18          
Mexico    -0.63          
New  Zealand    -0.58          
Pakistan    0.37          
Paraguay    -0.12          
Peru    -0.51          
Philippines    -0.56          
South  Africa    -0.67          
Thailand    -0.11          
Trinidad    -0.45          
Turkey    -0.23          
Ukraine    -0.10          
USA    -0.36          
Uruguay    -0.15          
Venezuela    0.00          
              

































Figure 6.  Leading Developing Countries involved in AD cases 
 
 
Figure 7 
 